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[New York] The recent indictment under which James J. Hines
of New York City was brought to
trial contained one count of conspiring to commit certain felonies
all violating the penal laws of the
State of New York, and 12 counts
charging the commission of the substantive felonies or crimes of contriving, proposing and drawing a
lottery, or assisting in contriving,
proposing and drawing a lottery.
After the state had taken up four
weeks in the presentation of its
case against the defendant, and
during the cross-examination of
Lyon Boston, the first witness for
the defense, District Attorney
Thomas E. Dewey asked the question which became the basis for a
motion for mistrial by defense
counsel, Lloyd Paul Stryker. The
motion was granted by Supreme
Court Justice Ferdinand Pecora.
(N. Y. Times, Sept. 11, 1938,"p. 47,
col. 3.)
To better understand the contentions pro and con concerning
this ruling, it is necessary to go
into the background of the witness
and the questions that were asked
of him on both direct and crossexamination. Boston was a former

assistant district attorney under
William Copeland Dodge, and in
that capacity had conducted a previous investigation of the policy
racket. Almost all of this investigation was made before the
Grand Jury for March, 1935. (N.
Y. Times, Sept. 11, f938, p. 44, col.
5.) On direct examination Stryker asked the witness the general
question-"Just tell the entire story
of that March grand jury. I think
it has been referred to quite generally as the runaway grand
jury." Boston replied that that
was *correct and Stryker continued,
'"Tell us your entire connection
with that, your entire association
with Mr. Wahl [another assistant
district attorney assisting in the
investigation], all that you recall
about that. Would that give you
an opportunity to tell me?" In
answer Boston testified that on the
instructions of Mr. Dodge he had
investigated Hines' connection with
the policy racket and also with the
slot machine racket and that he had
not found evidence sufficient to indict him. He further testified, in
answer to a leading question by
Stryker, that the laymen on the
grand jury desired to indict Hines
on no legal evidence at all, and that
when he advised them such action
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was impossible under the law, a
controversy arose which eventually resulted in the grand jury's
request for discharge. Stryker's
reason for delving into this past
investigation was to build up the
defense of "persecution." By pointing out to the jury that Hines had
once been investigated for the same
crime and that no evidence had
been found against him, he was
drawing out the inference that the
defendant was a victim of Dewey's
ambition.
On cross-examination
Dewey attempted to bring out that
there was other evidence before
that grand jury concerning Hines'
activities and that this other evidence might have been a substantial
factor in the desire to indict him.
In the course of his examination
he asked the question, "Don't you
remember any testimony about
Hines and the poultry racket there
by Morgan?" It was at this point
that Stryker moved for a mistrial
on the ground that Dewey had
made an intentional prejudicial
statement, not predicated on any
evidence in the case, for the sole
purpose of prejudicing the defendant on trial and as such it was
reversible error on appeal. (N. Y.
Times, Sept. 11, 1938, p. 47, col. 3.)
In support of his question Dewey
contended first, that Stryker's general question to the witness opened
the door for his inquiry into Hines'
connection with the poultry racket;
second, he had a right to ask the
question to impeach the credibility
of a witness; and third, that one
question could not prejudice the
defendant in the light of the 4600
pages of testimony that had been
given.
(N. Y. Times, Sept. 12,
1938.) Stryker, on the other hand,
claimed that nothing'in the direct
examination opened the door for
Dewey's question; that his broad
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question-and this in spite of the
fact that the witness on direct had
linked Hines with the slot machine
racket--dealt entirely with the
policy racket; and, although there
is nothing in the report of the case
to show this, that the court had
warned Dewey to confine himself
to the policy racket. (N. Y. Times,
Sept. 1"2, 1938.)
It cannot be conceived that
Dewey asked the question merely
to show the bad character of Hines.
There are too many other points
upon which it might be considered
relevant. He was completing a
story which the defense on direct
had left unfinished. He was impeaching the credibility of a witness. He was attempting to bring
out that Dodge, then district attorney, was protecting Hines before
the grand jury. This, he maintains,
was a vital issue of the trial, and
therefore a proper concern of the
prosecution in his cross-examination of the witness who was in a
positionto know what occurred before the grand jury. It is apparent
that Dewey was referring to the
testimony relating to the controversy between the district attorney's office and the grand jury,
which resulted in the grand jury's
request for discharge. The defense
claimed there was insufficient evidence to indict Hines and that the
grand jury requested its discharge
because the district attorney refused to indict on such evidence.
Dewey claimed there was sufficient
evidence to indict Hines, but that
the grand jury was driven to its
request by the district attorney's
refusal to co-operate with them.
While relevant for any of these
purposes the question is inadmissible for any of them on the basis
of the decision in People v. Molineux, 168 N. Y. 264, 61 N. E. 286
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(1901). That rule is substantially
followed by the courts of New
York and says, in effect, that on a
criminal trial the state cannot
prove any crime against the defendant not alleged in the indictment as aiding proof that he is
guilty of the crime charged unless
such other crime tends to prove
motive, intent, absence of mistake
or accident, identity of the person
charged, or a common scheme or
plan embracing the commission of
two or more crimes so closely related that proof of one tends to esSeemingly
tablish the other.
Dewey was attempting to show that
Hines, by virtue of his political
position, had a scheme or plan to
exact tribute from all the rackets
of New York City. The question
was not only relevant but admissible under this rule.
Stryker, in going into the investigation of Hines before that March
grand jury was showing that the
witness had made a fair, thorough, unfettered investigation and
that Hines' hands were clean. An
inference can be drawn from the
questions on direct that Stryker
was going even beyond this, that
without the use of direct questions
he was trying to prove Hines' good
character by this witness. If such
was the case, and Bostpn was actually a character witness for the defense, Dewey would have been
justified in asking him concerning
past criminal acts of the defendant.
People v. Jeffery, 31 N. Y. 267
(1894); People v. Callahan, 10 N.
Y. 1041 (1911).
In his opinion Justice Pecora refuses to consider Dewey's contentions and assumes that the question
was prejudicial. Comparing the
question to "one drop of poison"
in the human blood stream he cites
numerous cases to support him.
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These cases can be readily distinguished from the present one. The
two cases upon which he places the
most reliance are People v. Robinson, 273 N. Y. 438, 8 N. E. (2d) 25
(1937) and People v. Posner, 273
N. Y. 184, 7 N. E. (2d) 93 (1937).
In the former the decision of the
trial court was reversed not on the
unanswered questions of the district attorney, but on the prejudicial answer of the witness. In the
latter the district attorney insinuated by questions to which answers
were received that the defendant
had been guilty of improper conduct. By these questions, which
did not allow the telling of a complete story, the district attorney
built up a case against the defendant, and it was on the basis of the
series of questions and all the answers that the trial court was reversed. In the other cases cited by
the Justice like situations are
found, either the question climaxed
a series of insinuations by the district attorney, or the witness was
allowed to answer. In the present
case neither did the witness answer nor was there a series of insinuations on the part of Dewey.
Where a single improper question
has been asked and not answered
the great weight of authority supports the proposition that it is not
reversible error. U. S. v. Frankel
(C. C. A. 2nd, 1933), 65 F. (2d)
285; State v. Kwan, 25 P. (2d) 104,
174 Wash. 528 (1933); People v.
Gray, 218 P. 49, 63 Cal. App. 59
(1923). The New York court has
laid down an even broader rule in
People v. Pacelli, 251 N. Y. 66, 167
N. E. 173 (1929). In that case the
defendant was on trial for keeping
a disorderly house. A witness testified the defendant had admitted
to him and to the district attorney that she had been previously
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convicted on the same charge. The make available for jury service
district attorney in summation persons of the highest type. N. Y.
twice referred to the admission. Stat. (Baldwin, 1938), Jud. Law,
The trial judge instructed the jury arts. 16, 17, 18, 18b. It, above all
to disregard the admission. The other juries, should have been exCourt of Appeals held that an ad- pected to weigh the evidence for
monition to the jury by the trial what it was worth. Noted far and
judge to disregard the admission wide as the "blue ribbon jury" it
as no evidence in the case would was composed of men from the
cure the harm and it would not be upper walks of life whose intelligence was high, whose education
held reversible error.
was far above average; yet this asOn the basis of the peculiarities
of this situation it seems clear to pect of the case did not seem to
us that Justice Pecora abused his occur to Justice Pecora.
In the light of all the circumdiscretion in granting a new trial.
By refusing to rule on the motion stances it is apparent that Justice
at the time it was made and re- Pecora, should have ruled otherserving his opinion until a later wise. A great deal of money and
day he placed himself in a more time had been spent on behalf 6f
both the state and the defense.
difficult position than was necessary, for he gave the jury time to .Had he ruled otherwise he would
impress the question firmly on its have been supported not only by
mind. In spite of this it is ex- the law, but by common sense, and
tremely doubtful if this is "one justice would have been done not
drop of poison," at least a strong only the people of New York, but
enough drop to do the damage the defendant as well.
PE= WUSON.
claimed. Not only were there 4600
pages of testimony on the state's
side of the case, but the defense
ROBBERY-RETAKNG MoNEY LOST
itself had connected Hines with
DeAT
GAnINmG.-[California]
mathe
slot
still another crime,
chine racket. In view of this the fendant David Rosen was conquestion seems completely harm- victed of robbery for having forcless. If Hines was innocent he had ibly retaken $198 from one Whitnothing to fear from that one ques- comb, keeper of the funds in a
tion, and he had a right to have gambling house where defendant
that innocence declared by the had lost the sum retaken. On apjury. If they found him guilty he peal the California Supreme Court
still had his right of appeal to cor- reversed the conviction. People v.
Rosen, 78 P. (2d) 727 (Cal., 1938).
rect the error, if error it was.
The trial had been in progress Thus is poised the question of
for four weeks. The Justice was whether it is robbery for a person
ever alert to protect the defendant to forcibly retake from another
at all times. It is difficult, even money he has lost at gambling.
Although it is not clear whether
impossible, for a prosecutor to conduct a trial for that long a time Whitcomb was the proprietor of
without error, and if he did make Miller's Tango Parlor, at least he
a slip there was this jury to con- was an agent in charge of winsider. It had been impanelled un- nings and therefore may, for the
der the laws of *New York which purposes of our inquiry, be con-
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sidered as standing in the same intent to steal. People v. Sheasbey,
position as the winner. Further- supra.
more it is of no import that WhitTherefore the question resolves
comb may not have actually owned into the credibility of the defendthe money, for one having a right ant-witness, and it is a question
of possession against a wrongdoer for the jury whether a particular
is, so far as the latter is concerned, defendant had such a bona fide bethe "owner." Ex parte Duel, 11:2 lief. Johnson v. State, 24 Okla. Cr.
Cal. App. 24, 296 Pac. 91 (1931) Rep. 326, 2M8 Pac. 179 (1923). Acciting People v. Edwards, 72 Cal. cordingly the decision reached in
the instant case appears sound since
App. 102, 236 Pac. 944 (1925).
no prejudicial instruction was given
in
the
Calidefined
Robbery as
fornia Penal Code, §211, compar- the jury upon that point.
Looking more broadly at the
able to the common law and to the
statutes of other jurisdictions, is question, however, the main issue
"the felonious taking of personal is whether or not title has passed
property in the possession of an- to the winner of a gambling game
other, from his person or immedi- when the monev has been handed
ate presence, and against his will, over voluntarily by the loser. In
accomplished by means of force or their .treatment of this point the
fear."

various jurisdictions are not in acIn the instant case the only con- cord. Some courts maintain that
troversial issue is that of felonious it is untrue that one may acquire
intent or animus furandi-viz., in- a valid title to money by the
tent to appropriate the money. simple, but unlawful, process of
Johnson v. State, 24 Okla. Cr. Rep. gambling. Thompson v. Com. 13
S. W..1022 (Ky., 1892); People v.
326, 218 Pac. 179 (1923).
It is well settled that one cannot Henry, 202 Mich. 450, 168 N. W.
be guilty of robbery by taking from 534 (1918); State v. Price,38 Idaho
the possession of another his owr ]M9, 219 Pac. 1049 (1923); Sikes v.
specific property or property which Com., 34 S. -W. 902 (Ky., 1896).
he bona fide believes to be his Texas, on the contrary, holds that
own. This is true even though the voluntary delivery of possession of
taking is accomplished under cir- the money to the winner vests title
cumstances which would amount in him so that the forcible taking
to robbery if the property belonged thereof may be considered robbery.
to the person from whom taken. Coker v. State, 71 Tex. Crim. Rep.
54 C. J. 1028; 23 R. C. L. 1142; 504, 160 S. W. 366 (1913); Carroll
v. State, 42 Tex. Crim. Rep. 30, 57
Brown v. State, 28 Ark. 126 (1873);
Crawford v. State, 90 Ga. 701, 17 S. S. W. 99 (1900).
The latter view is supported by
EK 628 (1893); Triplett v. Com., 122
Ky. 35, 91 S.W. 281 (1906); People the judicial theory of in par!delicto
v. Hughes, 11 Utah 100, 39 Pac. 492 wherein both parties being equally
(1895); State v. Steele, 150 Wash. guilty are looked upon in the same
466, 273 Pac. 742 (1929); Butts v. light and the winner becomes the
Com., 145 Va. 800, 133 S. E. 764, owner when the money has been
768 (1926). The reason for this peacefully paid over. Blain v.
rule is that in such cases there State, 34 Tex. Crim. Rep. 448, 3f S.
cannot exist the requirement of an W. 368 (1895).
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assault with a deadly
It has been suggested that one grounds:
basis of distinction anent the issue weapon, aggravated assault, etc.,
of passage of title is the existence and the guilty party will not be
of statutory provisions giving the able to escape unscathed.
JOHN H. O'NEIL.
loser a civil right to recover the
money lost. 35 A. L. R. 1461, 1462.
In Texas where there is no such
FOR LEGALIZED
ABORTION-NEED
statute, the decisions hold, in cases
with fact situations similar to that ABoRTiOm-[English] That aborof the instant problem, that title tion was known to exist as far back
passes to the winner and that rob- as the early Greeks is evidenced
bery has been committed. Coker by its prohibition in the Oath of
v. State, supra; Carroll v. State, Hippocrates taken by healers. The
supra. In Kentucky and Michigan, religious and economic tendencies
where there are recovery statutes, of that time favored an increasing
title has been held to remain in population and were responsible
the loser, and consequently no rob- for its prohibition. Many of the
bery has been committed. People early writers were of the opinion,
v. Henry, supra; Thompson v. Com- however, that abortion might be
excusable or even commendable in
monwealth, supra.
However, in Idaho and Georgia, * a community faced with an inwhere there are no recovery stat- crease in population without a
utes the courts have held that no proportional means of subsistence
title has passed and that a convic- -the Malthusian theory. In Engtion for robbery must fail. State land in medieval times the inroads
v. Price, supra; Grant v. State, 115 of the Black Death, the Hundred
Years War, and the War of the
Ga. 205, 41 S. E. 698 (1902).
The latter jurisdictions indicate Roses made an increased birthrate
that the existence of recovery stat- necessary, thus furnishing the reautes is immaterial to the resolution son for the abortion law in the 14th
of the question, and there being a century. Minty, Medical Quacksplit in the authorities as to whether ery (1932) 142. At that time the
or not title has passed enabling a church was very powerful and had
robbery conviction to be upheld, a code of laws separate from the
the only forecast for the future can common law. If abortion had been
be based on public policy. The regarded as a religious problem, it
verdict in the instant case seems would have been prohibited in the
proper for a number of reasons: church's code rather than left to
1-robbery is a serious felony for the common law, thus it follows
which a person should not be con- that abortion was not contrary to
victed and cannot be convicted early religious principles.
Abortion is made a felony by
without proof of a felonious intent;
2-it is arguable whether title to statute in every state in the Union.
the winnings passes to the victor A typical example is that of Illior not; 3-although ignorance of nois, Ill. State Bar Stat. (1937) c.
the law is no excuse, a bona fide 38, §3, which provides that any
belief that the defendant is entitled person who performs an abortion
to the money prevents him from when it is not necessary to save
the mother's life, shall be senpossessing animus furandi; 4there can be a conviction on other tenced from 1-10 years. If the
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mother dies, such person shall be
prosecuted for rpurder.
The necessity of safeguarding the
morals of unmarried people, illeffect on the woman's health, danger to the safety of the state involved in unnatural limitation of
growth of population, and religious
pressure are the most common reasons advanced for passing abortion statutes. These statutes seem
never to have been properly enforced. Alabama has had only 40
prosecutions and of that number
only 5 convictions between 18921935; Cook County has had only
39 prosecutions and of that number only 9 convictions between
1925235. (1935) 35 Col. L. Rev.
87, 91, n. 18. On the other hand
we find the practice to be prevalent. The number of abortions in
Chicago alone is from 8,000-10,000
annually, while the total figure for
the entire country is about 680,000
annually. Kopp, Birth Control in
Practice (1934) 1M1-27. However,
it is almost impossible to get accurate statistics on the subject because it is so easily concealed under existing conditions. "The frequency of arrests or trials for
abortion afford no criterion of the
actual frequency of the crime.
Laws on abortion are so easily
evaded that officers of justice find
it useless to trouble themselves
with prosecution . . . ." Storer,
CriminalAbortion 136 (1868). The
paucity of prosecutions are attributable to the reluctance of the
legal profession to prosecute the
medical profession, the difficulty of
obtaining a prosecuting witness because of the unfavorable publicity
accompanying prosecution, and the
difficulty of detection because of
the secrecy of the operation.
The only exception to criminal
responsibility for abortion under
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the statutes is necessity in fact for
the preservation of the mother's
life-therapeutic abortion. As to
what constitutes necessity is a jury
question to be determined in the
particular case. Commonwealth v.
Hoyt, 279 Masa. 400, 181 N. E. 473
(1932); Commonwealth v. Polian,
288 Mass. 494, 193 N. E. 68 (1934)
Some state courts give a strict construction of the statutory exception
restricting it to the preservation of
life only. State v. Rudman, 126 Me.
177, 136 Atl. 817 (1927); Rodermund v. State, 167 Wis. 577, 168 N.
W. 390 (1918); State v. Powers, 155
Wash. 63, 283 Pac. 439 (1929). A
few States are more liberal allowing a physician to perform an abortion when peril to life is not necessarily imminent, but where health
State v.
would be impaired.
Dunlcelbarger, 206 Iowa 98, 221 N.
W. 592 (1928). This is a minority
view, however, in this country,
most American courts not giving
doctors discretionary power to operate under the statute. State v.
Tippie, 89 Oh. St. 35, 105 N. E. 75,
77 (1913). The motive of the doctor is immaterial and only a few
states recognize good faith as a defense. "Motive is more or less immaterial in abortion. The gist of
the crime is in the intent to procure a miscarriage. If the act is
done with this intent without a
lawful justification, the crime is
complete regardless of motive." 1
C. J. Sec. 312. Also State v. Rudman, supra; Hatchard v. State, 79
Wis. 357, 48 N. W. 380 (1891).
The situation has been almost
identical in England where, as in
America, abortion is made a felony
unless performed to save the
mother's life. Recently, however,
a prominent English obstetrician
performed an abortion on a 15 year
old girl to preserve her mental and

RECENT CRIMINAL CASES

597

physical health, and was prose- unsanitary performance. Most of
cuted under the English Preserva- the deaths arising from this operation of Life Statute. The girl had tion are due to infection. Kopp,
been criminally attacked and preg- supra, estimates about 680,000
nancy resulted. The physical in- abortions are performed annually
juries would not have caused diffi- in the United States and about
culty in delivery, but the circum- 8,000 deaths from termination of
stances were such that a mental pr6gnancy or about one death for
breakdown seemed likely if preg- every 75 abortions performedl
nancy was not terminated. See whereas in Russia where abortion
(1938) Journal of the American is legalized and under government
Medical Association, Vol IH, No. supervision there is only 1 death
8, 731. The defendant contended per every 20,000 abortions perthat the statute should be liberally formed. Thirdly, it has not raised
construed allowing doctors wide the moral standard of unmarried
latitude to terminate pregnancy people but rather has been avoided
when mental and physical health by the use of contraceptives.
were impaired, and there should Further, most abortions are perbe no dividing line between dan- formed upon married women who
ger to life and danger to health. submit to the operation because
Justice MacNaughten in summing 'more children would injure their
up said, "If pregnancy is likely to future health and because they are
make a woman a physical wreck" financially unable to support any
a doctor who operated in that be- more children. (1935) 35 Col. L.
lief did so "for the purpose of pre- Rev. 87, 93, n. 39. Finally abortion"
serving the mother's life." He fur- statutes have not resulted in an inther stated that the defendant had creased birth-rate because they
performed "an act of charity with- have not decreased the actual numout fee." The defendant was ac- ber of abortions.
quitted. N. Y. Times, July 20,
Giving a more liberal interpretation to our existing statutes as in
1938, page 4, col. 2.
This is clearly an advance over the English case is not an effective
solution, since the shadow of crimAmerican decisions. The interpretation of the American statutes is inality would still be cast over docunsatisfactory for several reasons. tors terminating pregnancy and
First, the abortion statutes have would discourage them -from perresulted in abortions being per- forming the operation in justifiable
formed by quacks, midwives and cases. Seemingly the solution lies
incompetent doctors, because rep- in the hands of the legislature. A
utable physicians are afraid of law should be passed and strictly
prosecution and blackmail if- they enforced making it a criminal of
perform an abortion. Secondly, fense for anyone but a licensed
even if the doctor or midwife is physician to perform an abortion.
skilled they must operate with a While the number of prosecutions
secrecy which prevents the subse- under the statutes at present, are
quent attention necessary for the few making it a seemingly unimsafest performance of the opera- portant law, its effects are in realtion. One of the greatest dangers ity far-reaching in that it is indiin procuring an abortion is the pos- rectly responsible for the high
sibility of infection arising from its death rate in abortion operations.
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Legalized abortion would eliminate
this evil. One of the leading arguments against legalized abortion is
that it would greatly decrease the
birth rate. True, there would be
an increase in the number of abortions among poorer classes of people but this would seem to be more
.of a good than an evil. The total
number of abortions for all classes
would not increase to such an extent as to seriously decrease the
present birth rate because physicians would only act in justifiable
cases. Further, normal married
people do not want to avoid childbirth unless they absolufely have
to.
The advantages of legalized abortion would be manifold. It would
enable the dissemination of accurate statistical information. Moreover, protection of the social, physical, and mental future of innocent
girls who have been criminally attacked would be afforded. Likewise it would make for better future generations by providing a
means of eliminating the birth of
children to physical and mental defectives. Minty, supra, 151 writes,
"Many mentally defective children
are born of mentally defective parents. It is almost certain that mentally defective women will breed
mentally defective children. Those
who allow such children to be born
are guilty of a grave moral crime,
for such a child is condemned to
inescapable misery and degradation . . . ." Finally, it would
eliminate the extortionate prices
now charged by quacks and midwives who are able to charge high
prices because of the risk they take
rather than for the skill that is
required to perform it properly.
Reputable doctors would perform
the operation at a nominal charge
and under sanitary conditions when

RECENT CRIMINAL CASES
in their discretion as a physician
it is physically, socially, and economically desirable.
JACK FROST.

LOTTERY-WHAT IS A LoTTRYTo
As UNFAIR TRADE.-[Illinois]
promote advertising a distributor
of gas and oil products gave qualifying cards not only to purchasers
of his products but also to any auto
owner or driver requesting them. At
the end of each month the holder of
such a card was entitled to participate in a cash drawing of $200. A
competing gas and oil merchant just
across the street sought to enjoin
the defendant, claiming the plan
was a lottery. Held: temporary
injunction affirmed on appeal.
Jones v. Smith Oil & Refining Co.,
The
15 N. E. (2nd) 42 (1'938).
court found the three elements of
a lottery-prize, chance, and consideration-constituted a plan violating the law and unfair to plaintiff's business.
In England as early as 1541 an
act prohibited lotteries because the
young men spent their time gambling instead of practicing archery.
Later in 1698 another act forbade
lotteries because they were inimical to good trade, welfare, and
peace. 173 L. T. 237 (1932). Then
in 1823 the English Parliament prohibited all lotteries except those
authorized by Parliament. Lotteries Act, 4 Geo. 4, c. 60 (1823). This
includes horse racing subscriptions.
Allport v. Nutt, 14 L. J. 272 (1845).
Finally in 1934 the Betting and
Lotteries Act prohibited all lotteries except small ones incidental to
entertainments and private lotteries; the Act further permitted lottery tickets to be sent through the
mails. See 78 L. J. 433 (1934).
This relaxation in the attitude
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toward lotteries may be an effect
of the Irish Hospitals Sweepstakes,
a charity enterprise, which finds a
huge market for its tickets in England. Journal of Comp. Legis. and
International Law, Vol. 14, p. 286
(3rd series, 1932).
Though England has relaxed its
lottery law somewhat, many of the
states in this country still have
laws forbidding lotteries. See 2
Wharton, Criminal Law, §§1777,
1778 (12th ed., 1932) and cases
cited. In further tightening the
state restrictions, Congress has
closed the mails and interstate commerce against lottery tickets. The
Lpttery Case, 188 U. S. 321 (1903).
The disfavor in the United States
against lotteries is founded in the
protection of those who would dissipate their money by gambling
against odds not fully appreciated.
See 45 Harv. L. Rev. 1205 (1931).
Further evils of lotteries include
enhancement of a desire to get
something not earned, the encouragement of the gambling instinct,
and the destruction of individual
initiative essential to individual
livelihood and citizenship. State
ex rel. Hunter v. Fox Beatrice
Theatre Corp., 133 Neb. 392, 275 N.
W. 605 (1937).
The usual concept of a lottery
attaches to a scheme for the distribution of prizes by chance
among persois purchaihAg tickets.
2 Wharton, op. cit., p. 2075, §1778.
Not having an exact legal definition the word lottery may be construed in this commonly accepted
meaning. U. S. v. Olney, Fed. Cas.
No. 15, 1918 (1868). Difficulty of
interpretation hinges not so much
on prize and chance as on the element of consideration. The idea
that the consideration is the price
paid by the purchaser for the
chance to get a prize is fundamen-
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tal. Cf. Williston on Contracts §100
(1926).
Variations of this idea
make for difficulty in the lottery
question.
Where lottery tickets are bought
outright for a chance to win a prize,
the consideration is plain in that
moniey has been paid for the ticket
alone. Where chances are bought
with purchases, even though at no
increased cost, of entertainment or
merchandise, there is a lottery on
the ground that the price furnishes
the consideration for both. State
V. Powell, 170 Minn. 239, 212 N. W.
169 (1927). But see R. J. Williams
FurnitureCo. v. McComb Chamber
of Commerce, 147 Miss. 649, 112 So.
579 (1927).
Where 'chances ate
offered to purchasers and non-purchasers alike, the courts are hopelessly divided. Some may find
consideration, as in the theater
cases, in increased attendance and
the fact that free ticket distribution was negligible. State v. Danz,
140 Wash. 349, 250 Pac. 37 (1926).
In a case similar to the instant case
the court penetrated through the
free distribution plan and held that
the price paid constituted the aggregate price for the merchandise
and the chance. Featherstone v.
Independent Service Station Ass'n,
10 S. W. (2nd) 124 (Tex., Civ.
App., 1928).
Other courts say
there ,is no lottery where a contestant may obtain a chance withoi4 laying for entei-tainment or
merchandise. Cross v. People, 18
Colo. 321, 32 Pac. 821 (1893); People v. Mail Express Co., 179 N. Y.
S. 640 (1919); State v. Hundling,
220 Iowa 1369, 264 N. W. 608 (1936).
But see Maughs v. Porter,157 Va.
415, i61 S. E. 242 (1931) where
consideration for a lottery was
found in mere attendance at an
auction sale. This interpretation of
consideration has been criticized.
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80 U. Pa. L. Rev. 744 (1932); 18
Va. L. Rev 465 (1932). However,
though pecuniary consideration
may not be found for a lottery to
convict in a criminal prosecution,
there may be enough consideration
to support a suit by the winner for
collection of the prize. Corio v.
Laurelton Amusement Co., N. Y.
L. J., p. 764, col. 2 (Feb. 13, 1937,
Sup. Ct. App. term). That is, the
contract was not affected by the
lottery laws because the ticket
holder had not paid monetary consideration. Such an approach lends
support to a belief that courts
might construe a different consideration in a civil suit than in a
lottery prosecution. See 37 Col.
L Rev. 877 (1937).
In some instances courts may also
look to see whether the plan in
question is an evasion of the statute or an avoidance of the statute,
the latter being permitted. State v.
Eames, 87 N. H. 477, 183 AtL 590
(1936). Thus there was an evasion where the plan was changed
from one giving tickets only to
customers to one giving tickets both
to customers and non-customers.
Featherstone v. Independent Service Ass'n, supra. In the instant
case which relies heavily on the
Featherstone case, there was no
such evasion.
The court relied also on a bank
night case, Iris Amusement Co. v.
Kelly, 366 Ill. 256, 8 N. E. (2nd)
648 (1937) which found consideration for an increased chance to win
in the price of admission. In applying this case to the instant situation the court apparently overlooked the distinguishing fact that
had an equal
non-purchasers
chance with purchasers in the gas
and oil scheme because all were
privileged to attend the drawing.
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In interpreting consideration for
the non-purchasers the court said
that the money paid in by those
who purchased gas and oil and received tickets furnished the consideration for non-purchasers. If
the participation of non-purchasers
was negligible, such a test of consideration might be valid. But as
the amount of non-purchaser participation increases (and the court
does not say here that non-purchaser participation was negligible)
the proposed test of consideration
seems inadequate. Indeed by this
test if 5% of participants were purchasers and 95% were not, then the
court would be placed in an anomalous position by declaring consideration from purchasers furnished consideration for the lottery when in reality the monetary
consideration was negligible. Failing to stress the fact of participation, the court lays down a formula
which might well work an injustice in a case where free participation is a reality.
The original aversion to lotteries,
based on the protection of those
who might lose their money in an
effort to get something for nothing, thus has been expanded to
protect by injunction a merchant's
advertising scheme in which no one
loses any money--except the protected merchant whose business
decreased. Declaring a lottery did
not protect anyone from dissipating
his money. Insofar as lottery laws
may be designed for other purposes the court might well have
examined the fact of non-purchaser
participation to supplement its theory of consideration, particularly if
such participation was negligible.
The court in effect disregarded the
non-purchasers in its effort to declare a lottery, that is, it did not
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look into the extent of their activity in the plan. Much more intellectually satisfactory would it
have been if the court had openly
declared that monetary consideration was not required for a lottery

or that the plan was illegal because
it made the disposal of property dependent upon a chance by lot. See
Smith-Hurd, IlL, StAt. c. 38, §406
(1937).
0.
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